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Constructions of truly practical secure protocols using standardsmartcards
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Device security table of contents
Pages 491-500  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Carmit Hazay  Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Yehuda Lindell  Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper we show that using standard smartcards it is possible to construct truly practical secure protocols for a variety of tasks. Our protocols achieve full simulation-based security in the presence of malicious adversaries, and can be run on very large inputs. We present protocols for secure set intersection, oblivious database search and more. We have also implemented our set intersection protocol in order to show that it is truly practical: on sets of size 30,000 elements takes 20 seconds for one party and 30 minutes for the other (where the latter can be parallelized to further reduce the time). This demonstrates that in settings where physical smartcards can be sent between parties (as in the case of private data mining tasks between security and governmental agencies), it is possible to use secure protocols with proven simulation-based security.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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C. Hazay and Y. Lindell. Efficient Protocols for Set Intersection and Pattern Matching with Security Against Malicious and Covert Adversaries. In 5th TCC, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 4948), pages 155--175, 2008.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Carmit Hazay: colleagues
Yehuda Lindell: colleagues