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RFIDs and secret handshakes: defending against ghost-and-leech attacks and unauthorized reads with context-aware communications
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Device security table of contents
Pages 479-490  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Alexei Czeskis  University of Washignton, Seattle, WA, USA
Karl Koscher  University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
Joshua R. Smith  Intel Research Seattle, Seattle, WA, USA
Tadayoshi Kohno  University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We tackle the problem of defending against ghost-and-leech (a.k.a. proxying, relay, or man-in-the-middle) attacks against RFID tags and other contactless cards. The approach we take -- which we dub secret handshakes -- is to incorporate gesture recognition techniques directly on the RFID tags or contactless cards. These cards will only engage in wireless communications when they internally detect these secret handshakes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by implementing our secret handshake recognition system on a passive WISP RFID tag with a built-in accelerometer. Our secret handshakes approach is backward compatible with existing deployments of RFID tag and contactless card readers.

Our approach was also designed to minimize the changes to the existing usage model of certain classes of RFID and contactless cards, like access cards kept in billfold and purse wallets, allowing the execution of secret handshakes without removing the card from one's wallet. Our techniques could extend to improving the security and privacy properties of other uses of RFID tags, like contactless payment cards.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Alexei Czeskis: colleagues
Karl Koscher: colleagues
Joshua R. Smith: colleagues
Tadayoshi Kohno: colleagues