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Multisignatures secure under the discrete logarithm assumption and a generalized forking lemma
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Applied cryptography 1 table of contents
Pages 449-458  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Ali Bagherzandi  University of California at Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
Jung-Hee Cheon  Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
Stanislaw Jarecki  University of California at Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Multisignatures allow n signers to produce a short joint signature on a single message. Multisignatures were achieved in the plain model with a non-interactive protocol in groups with bilinear maps, by Boneh et al, and by a three-round protocol under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption, by Bellare and Neven, with multisignature verification cost of, respectively, O(n) pairings or exponentiations. In addition, multisignatures with O(1) verification were shown in so-called Key Verification (KV) model, where each public key is accompanied by a short proof of well-formedness, again either with a non-interactive protocol using bilinear maps, by Ristenpart and Yilek, or with a three-round protocol under the Diffie-Hellman assumption, by Bagherzandi and Jarecki.

We improve on these results in two ways: First, we show a two-round O(n)-verification multisignature secure under the DL assumption in the plain model, improving on the three-round protocol of Bellare-Neven. Second, we show a two-round O(1)-verification multisignature secure under the DL assumption in the KV model, improving on assumptions and/or communication rounds of the schemes of Ristenpart and Yilek and Bagherzandi and Jarecki. Exact security of both schemes matches (in ROM) that of Schnorr signatures. The reduced round complexity is due to a new multiplicatively homomorphic equivocable commitment scheme which can be of independent interest. Moreover, our KV model scheme is enabled by a generalized forking lemma, which shows that standard non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs of knowledge in ROM admit efficient simultaneous post-execution extraction of witnesses of all proof instances. As a consequence of this lemma, any DL-based multisignature secure in so-called Knowledge-of-Secret-Key model can be implemented in the KV model using standard ROM-based NIZK's of DL as proofs of key well-formedness.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Ali Bagherzandi: colleagues
Jung-Hee Cheon: colleagues
Stanislaw Jarecki: colleagues