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Towards automated proofs for asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Formal methods 2 table of contents
Pages 371-380  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Judicaël Courant  Universite Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag, Grenoble, France
Marion Daubignard  Universite Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag, Grenoble, France
Cristian Ene  Universite Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag, Grenoble, France
Pascal Lafourcade  Universite Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag, Grenoble, France
Yassine Lakhnech  Universite Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag, Grenoble, France
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Chosen-ciphertext security is by now a standard security property for asymmetric encryption. Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. This paper presents an automated procedure for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare-Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC'2000 and REACT.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Judicaël Courant: colleagues
Marion Daubignard: colleagues
Cristian Ene: colleagues
Pascal Lafourcade: colleagues
Yassine Lakhnech: colleagues