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Type-checking zero-knowledge
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Formal methods 2 table of contents
Pages 357-370  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Michael Backes  Saarland University, MPI-SWS, Saarbruecken, Germany
Cǎtǎlin Hritcu  Saarland University, Saarbruecken, Germany
Matteo Maffei  Saarland University, Saarbruecken, Germany
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the first type system for statically analyzing security protocols that are based on zero-knowledge proofs. We show how certain properties offered by zero-knowledge proofs can be characterized in terms of authorization policies and statically enforced by a type system. The analysis is modular and compositional, and provides security proofs for an unbounded number of protocol executions. We develop a new type-checker that conducts the analysis in a fully automated manner. We exemplify the applicability of our technique to real-world protocols by verifying the authenticity and secrecy properties of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. The analysis of DAA takes less than three seconds.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael Backes: colleagues
Cǎtǎlin Hritcu: colleagues
Matteo Maffei: colleagues