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Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Privacy 2 table of contents
Pages 267-278  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Prateek Mittal  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
Nikita Borisov  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We analyze information leaks in the lookup mechanisms of structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems and how these leaks can be used to compromise anonymity. We show that the techniques that are used to combat active attacks on the lookup mechanism dramatically increase information leaks and increase the efficacy of passive attacks. Thus there is a trade-off between robustness to active and passive attacks.

We study this trade-off in two P2P anonymous systems, Salsa and AP3. In both cases, we find that, by combining both passive and active attacks, anonymity can be compromised much more effectively than previously thought, rendering these systems insecure for most proposed uses. Our results hold even if security parameters are changed or other improvements to the systems are considered. Our study therefore motivates the search for new approaches to P2P anonymous communication.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Prateek Mittal: colleagues
Nikita Borisov: colleagues