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Enforcing authorization policies using transactional memory introspection
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: System security 1 table of contents
Pages 223-234  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Arnar Birgisson  Reykjavik University, Reykjavik, Iceland
Mohan Dhawan  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ, USA
Úlfar Erlingsson  Reykjavik University, Reykjavik, Iceland
Vinod Ganapathy  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ, USA
Liviu Iftode  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Correct enforcement of authorization policies is a difficult task, especially for multi-threaded software. Even in carefully-reviewed code, unauthorized access may be possible in subtle corner cases. We introduce Transactional Memory Introspection (TMI), a novel reference monitor architecture that builds on Software Transactional Memory--a new, attractive alternative for writing correct, multi-threaded software.

TMI facilitates correct security enforcement by simplifying how the reference monitor integrates with software functionality. TMI can ensure complete mediation of security-relevant operations, eliminate race conditions related to security checks, and simplify handling of authorization failures. We present the design and implementation of a TMI-based reference monitor and experiment with its use in enforcing authorization policies on four significant servers. Our experiments confirm the benefits of the TMI architecture and show that it imposes an acceptable runtime overhead.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Arnar Birgisson: colleagues
Mohan Dhawan: colleagues
Úlfar Erlingsson: colleagues
Vinod Ganapathy: colleagues
Liviu Iftode: colleagues