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SOMA: mutual approval for included content in web pages
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Browser security table of contents
Pages 89-98  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Terri Oda  Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Glenn Wurster  Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
P. C. van Oorschot  Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Anil Somayaji  Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Unrestricted information flows are a key security weakness of current web design. Cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, and other attacks typically require that information be sent or retrieved from arbitrary, often malicious, web servers. In this paper we propose Same Origin Mutual Approval (SOMA), a new policy for controlling information flows that prevents common web vulnerabilities. By requiring site operators to specify approved external domains for sending or receiving information, and by requiring those external domains to also approve interactions, we prevent page content from being retrieved from malicious servers and sensitive information from being communicated to an attacker. SOMA is compatible with current web applications and is incrementally deployable, providing immediate benefits for clients and servers that implement it. SOMA has an overhead of one additional HTTP request per domain accessed and can be implemented with minimal effort by application and web browser developers. To evaluate our proposal, we have developed a Firefox SOMA add-on.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Terri Oda: colleagues
Glenn Wurster: colleagues
P. C. van Oorschot: colleagues
Anil Somayaji: colleagues