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Data Collection with Self-Enforcing Privacy
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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 12 ,  Issue 2  (December 2008) table of contents
Article No. 9  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Philippe Golle  Palo Alto Research Center
Frank McSherry  Microsoft Research
Ilya Mironov  Microsoft Research
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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DOI Bookmark: 10.1145/1455518.1455521

ABSTRACT

Consider a pollster who wishes to collect private, sensitive data from a number of distrustful individuals. How might the pollster convince the respondents that it is trustworthy? Alternately, what mechanism could the respondents insist upon to ensure that mismanagement of their data is detectable and publicly demonstrable?

We detail this problem, and provide simple data submission protocols with the properties that a) leakage of private data by the pollster results in evidence of the transgression and b) the evidence cannot be fabricated without breaking cryptographic assumptions. With such guarantees, a responsible pollster could post a “privacy-bond,” forfeited to anyone who can provide evidence of leakage. The respondents are assured that appropriate penalties are applied to a leaky pollster, while the protection from spurious indictment ensures that any honest pollster has no disincentive to participate in such a scheme.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Philippe Golle: colleagues
Frank McSherry: colleagues
Ilya Mironov: colleagues