ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Studying misbehavior in CSMA/CA Wireless LANs
Full text PdfPdf (222 KB)
Source
International Workshop on Modeling Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems archive
Proceedings of the 3nd ACM workshop on Performance monitoring and measurement of heterogeneous wireless and wired networks table of contents
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Pages 145-150  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-239-9
Author
Nader Hatami  Concordia University, Montreal, PQ, Canada
Sponsors
SIGSIM: ACM Special Interest Group on Simulation and Modeling
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 16,   Downloads (12 Months): 84,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1454630.1454652
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Security is a fundamental aspect for achieving high availability and reliability in wireless networks. Wireless medium access control (MAC) protocols use distributed contention resolution mechanisms for sharing the wireless medium. Wireless nodes decide access to their channel independently and accessing the channel by a node has an influence on those of other nodes. In this environment, selfish nodes that do not obey the operation of the MAC protocol may obtain an unfair share of the channel bandwidth at the expense of well-behaved nodes.

Game theory is a useful and powerful tool to research this kind of systems. We study the effect of misbehavior in CSMA/CA wireless LANs and in particular in Idle Sense access method which has been designed to optimize the performance and fairness of the network using game theory. We show that Nash equilibrium point of our game is not an optimal point of the game. Then we find the Pareto-optimal point of our game using static game model from Nash bargaining framework. We design a prevention model to force nodes converge to the Pareto-optimal point and make the Pareto-optimal point as the Nash equilibrium point of our game. Finally, we devise a detection system to detect deviating cheaters from optimal point.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
 
2
M. Cagalj, S. Ganeriwal, I. Aad and J. P. Hubaux; On selfish Behavior in CSMA/CA networks; in Proceedings of IEEE Infocom, 2005.
3
 
4
Y. Xiao, X. Shan and Y. Ren; Game Theory Models for IEEE 802.11 DCF in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks; in Proceedings of IEEE Radio Communications, 2005.
 
5
J. Konorski; CSMA/CA Performance Under Backoff Attacks: A Game-Theoretic Context; in Proceedings of MMB, 2004.
 
6
G. Bianchi; Peformance Analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination fucntion; in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 18(3):535--547, March 2000.
 
7
LAN/MAN Standards Committee, ANSI/IEEE Std 802.11:Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
 
8
Network Simulator (NS), http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/