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Effective blame for information-flow violations
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Source Foundations of Software Engineering archive
Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of software engineering table of contents
Atlanta, Georgia
SESSION: Security and fault detection table of contents
Pages 250-260  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-995-1
Authors
Dave King  The Pennyslvania State University, University Park, PA
Trent Jaeger  The Pennyslvania State University, University Park, PA
Somesh Jha  University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI
Sanjit A. Seshia  University of California, Berkeley, CA
Sponsor
SIGSOFT: ACM Special Interest Group on Software Engineering
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Programs trusted with secure information should not release that information in ways contrary to system policy. However, when a program contains an illegal flow of information, current information-flow reporting techniques are inadequate for determining the cause of the error. Reasoning about information-flow errors can be difficult, as the flows involved can be quite subtle. We present a general model for information-flow blame that can explain the source of such security errors in code. This model is implemented by changing the information-flow verification procedure to: (1) generate supplementary information to reveal otherwise hidden program dependencies; (2) modify the constraint solver to construct a blame dependency graph; and (3) develop an explanation procedure that returns a complete and minimal error report. Our experiments show that information-flow errors can generally be explained and resolved by viewing only a small fraction of the total code.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Dave King: colleagues
Trent Jaeger: colleagues
Somesh Jha: colleagues
Sanjit A. Seshia: colleagues