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Understanding implications of DNS zone provisioning
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Internet Measurement Conference archive
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement table of contents
Vouliagmeni, Greece
SESSION: Infrastructure table of contents
Pages: 211-216  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-334-1
Authors
Andrew J. Kalafut  Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA
Craig A. Shue  Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA
Minaxi Gupta  Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA
Sponsors
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
SIGMETRICS: ACM Special Interest Group on Measurement and Evaluation
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

DNS is a critical component of the Internet. This paper takes a comprehensive look at the provisioning of Internet domains and its impact on the availability of various services. To gather data, we sweep 60% of the Internet's domains for zone transfers. 6.6% of them allow us to transfer their complete information. We find that carelessness in handling DNS records can lead to reduced availability of name servers, email, and Web servers. It also undermines anti-spam efforts and the efforts to shut down phishing sites or to contain malware infections.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Andrew J. Kalafut: colleagues
Craig A. Shue: colleagues
Minaxi Gupta: colleagues