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An exercise in selfish stabilization
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ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS) archive
Volume 3 ,  Issue 4  (November 2008) table of contents
Article No. 15  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:1556-4665
Authors
Johanne Cohen  LORIA-CNRS
Anurag Dasgupta  University of Iowa
Sukumar Ghosh  University of Iowa
Sébastien Tixeuil  Université Pierre and Marie Curie
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Stabilizing distributed systems expect all the component processes to run predefined programs that are externally mandated. In Internet scale systems, this is unrealistic, since each process may have selfish interests and motives related to maximizing its own payoff. This article formulates the problem of selfish stabilization to show how competition blends with cooperation in a stabilizing environment.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Johanne Cohen: colleagues
Anurag Dasgupta: colleagues
Sukumar Ghosh: colleagues
Sébastien Tixeuil: colleagues