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ABSTRACT
Stabilizing distributed systems expect all the component processes to run predefined programs that are externally mandated. In Internet scale systems, this is unrealistic, since each process may have selfish interests and motives related to maximizing its own payoff. This article formulates the problem of selfish stabilization to show how competition blends with cooperation in a stabilizing environment.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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[doi> 10.1145/1127777.1127792]
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