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MiniMax equilibrium of networked differential games
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ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS) archive
Volume 3 ,  Issue 4  (November 2008) table of contents
Article No. 14  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:1556-4665
Authors
Hui Cao  Ohio State University, Columbus, OH
Emre Ertin  Ohio State University, Columbus, OH
Anish Arora  Ohio State University, Columbus, OH
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Surveillance systems based on wireless sensor network technology have been shown to successfully detect, classify and track evaders over a large area. State information collected via the sensor network also enables these systems to actuate mobile agents so as to achieve surveillance goals, such as target capture and asset protection. But satisfying these goals is complicated by the fact that the track information in a sensor network is routed to mobile agents through multihop wireless communication links and is thus subject to message delays and losses. Stabilization must also be considered in designing pursuer strategies so as to deal with state corruption as well as suboptimal evader strategies.

In this article, we formulate optimal pursuit control strategies in the presence of network effects, assuming that target track information has been established locally in the sensor network. We adapt ideas from the theory of differential games to networked games—including ones involving nonperiodic track updates, message losses and message delays—to derive optimal strategies, bounds on the information requirements, and scaling properties of these bounds. We show the inherent stabilization features of our pursuit strategies, both in terms of implementation as well as the strategies themselves.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Basar, T. and Olsder, G. J. 1999. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. SIAM.
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Chen, P. and Sastry, S. 2006. Pursuit controller performance guarantees for a lifeline pursuit-evasion game over a wireless sensor network. In Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA.
 
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Isaacs, R. 1975. Differential Games. Kruger Publishing Company, Huntington, NY.
 
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Kulathumani, V., Arora, A., Demirbas, M., and Sridharan, M. 2007. Trail: a distance sensitive network protocol for distributed object tracking. In Proceedings of European Conference on Wireless Sensor Networks (EWSN).
 
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Schenato, L., Oh, S., and Sastry, S. 2005. Swarm coordination for pursuit evasion games using sensor networks. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Robotics and Automation.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Hui Cao: colleagues
Emre Ertin: colleagues
Anish Arora: colleagues