Computational challenges in e-commerce

ABSTRACT

Economic and social sciences will drive Internet protocols and services into the future.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.2 Network Protocols

Additional Classification:
  J. Computer Applications
  J.7 COMPUTERS IN OTHER SYSTEMS

  K. Computing Milieux
  K.4 COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY
      K.4.4 Electronic Commerce