| Efficient auction-based grid reservations using dynamic programming |
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Conference on High Performance Networking and Computing
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Proceedings of the 2008 ACM/IEEE conference on Supercomputing - Volume 00
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Austin, Texas
Article No. 16
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-4244-2835-9
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Authors
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Andrew Mutz
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University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA
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Rich Wolski
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University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA
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IEEE Press
Piscataway, NJ, USA
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ABSTRACT
Auction mechanisms have been proposed as a means to efficiently and fairly schedule jobs in high-performance computing environments. The Generalized Vickrey Auction has long been known to produce efficient allocations while exposing users to truth-revealing incentives, but the algorithms used to compute its payments can be computationally intractable. In this paper we present a novel implementation of the Generalized Vickrey Auction that uses dynamic programming to schedule jobs and compute payments in pseudo-polynomial time. Additionally, we have built a version of the PBS scheduler that uses this algorithm to schedule jobs, and in this paper we present the results of our tests using this scheduler.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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[doi> 10.1145/1080192.1080195]
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