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Utility pricing auction for multi-period resource allocation in multi-machine flow shop problems
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Source ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 342 archive
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Innsbruck, Austria
SESSION: AGENTS-1 table of contents
Article No. 5  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-075-3
Authors
Hoong Chuin Lau  Singapore Management University, Singapore
Zhengyi John Zhao  Singapore Management University, Singapore
Shuzhi Sam Ge  National University of Singapore, Singapore
Tong Heng Lee  National University of Singapore, Singapore
Sponsor
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we consider a multi-machine multi-period resource allocation problem among multiple agents, each of which is responsible to solve a flowshop scheduling problem. We present an iterated combinatorial auction approach in which bid generation is performed within each agent, and the concept of utility pricing is then applied in the process of price adjustment. We compare with the conventional price adjustment scheme proposed in Fisher (1985), and show better convergence properties. Experimentally, we compare our approach against an integer programming model as well as conventional price adjustment schemes, and achieve drastic run time improvement.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Hoong Chuin Lau: colleagues
Zhengyi John Zhao: colleagues
Shuzhi Sam Ge: colleagues
Tong Heng Lee: colleagues