ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
A novel AES cryptographic core highly resistant to differential power analysis attacks
Full text PdfPdf (201 KB)
Source
SBCCI archive
Proceedings of the 21st annual symposium on Integrated circuits and system design table of contents
Gramado, Brazil
SESSION: Advances in low power design and power management table of contents
Pages 140-145  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-231-3
Authors
Felipe Ghellar  Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil
Marcelo S. Lubaszewski  Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGDA: ACM Special Interest Group on Design Automation
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 13,   Downloads (12 Months): 77,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1404371.1404413
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

In this work, we present a novel core implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard with an integrated countermeasure against side channel attacks, which can theoretically increase the complexity of a DPA attack by a factor of 240. This countermeasure is based on mathematical properties of the Rijndael algorithm, and retains compatibility with the published Standard. The entire system was designed from the ground up to allow the reutilization of the building blocks in many different combinations, thus providing for design space exploration. Synthesis results show that the protected core can perfectly meet the performance constraints of currently used smart cards.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
 
2
B. Barak, R. Shaltiel, and E. Tromer. True Random Number Generators Secure in a Changing Environment. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2003, volume 2779 of LNCS, pages 166--180. Springer, 2003.
 
3
E. Barkan and E. Biham. In How Many Ways Can You Write Rijndael? In Advances in Cryptology -- Asiacrypt 2002, volume 2501 of LNCS, pages 160--175. Springer, 2002.
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
E. Hess, N. Janssen, B. Meyer, and T. Schütze. Information Leakage Attacks Against Smart Card Implementations of Cryptographic Algorithms and Countermeasures -- A Survey. In Proc. EUROSMART Security Conference, pages 55--64, 2000.
 
8
 
9
 
10
 
11
Mentor Graphics. LeonardoSpectrum, 2006. http://www.mentor.com/products/
 
12
 
13
National Institute of Standards and Technologies. Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197), 2001.
 
14
 
15
S. Örs, E. Oswald, and B. Preneel. Power-Analysis Attacks on an FPGA -- First Experimental Results. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2003, volume 2779 of LNCS, pages 35--50. Springer, 2003.
 
16
H. Raddum. More Dual Rijndaels. In AES 2004 -- 4th International Conference, volume 3373 of LNCS, pages 142--147. Springer, 2005.
 
17
V. Rijmen and E. Oswald. Representations and Rijndael Descriptions. In AES 2004 -- 4th International Conference, volume 3373 of LNCS, pages 148--158. Springer, 2005.
 
18
A. Rostovtsev and O. Shemyakina. AES side channel attacks protection using random isomorphisms. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/087. Available from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/087
 
19
W. Schindler, K. Lemke, and C. Paar. A Stochastic Model for Differential Side Channel Cryptanalysis. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2005, volume 3659 of LNCS, pages 30--46. Springer, 2005.
 
20
S.-Y. Wu, S.-C. Lu, and C. S. Laih. Design of AES Based on Dual Cipher and Composite Field. In Topics in Cryptology -- CT-RSA 2004, volume 2964 of LNCS, pages 25--38. Springer, 2004.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Felipe Ghellar: colleagues
Marcelo S. Lubaszewski: colleagues