Take a look at the new version of this page: [ beta version ]. Tell us what you think.

ABSTRACT

In order to stimulate cooperation among nodes in P2P systems, some form of incentive mechanism is necessary so as to encourage service contribution. Hence, designing and evaluating the stability, robustness and performance of incentive policies is extremely critical. In this paper, we propose a general mathematical framework to evaluate the stability and evolution of a family of shared history based incentive policies. To illustrate the utility of the framework, we present two incentive policies and show why one incentive policy can lead to a total system collapse while the other is stable and operates at the optimal point. One can use this mathematical framework to design and analyze various incentive policies and verify whether they match the design objectives of the underlying P2P systems.

REFERENCES

• 1: Michal Feldman , Kevin Lai , Ion Stoica , John Chuang, Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA [doi>10.1145/988772.988788]
• 2: Michal Feldman , Christos Papadimitriou , John Chuang , Ion Stoica, Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems, Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems, September 03-03, 2004, Portland, Oregon, USA [doi>10.1145/1016527.1016539]
• 3: M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica. Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. In Workshop on Economics and Information Security, 2004.
• 4: Philippe Golle , Kevin Leyton-Brown , Ilya Mironov , Mark Lillibridge, Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce, p.75-87, November 16-17, 2001
• 5: K. Lai, M. Feldman, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang. Incentives for cooperation in P2P networks. In Workshop on Economics of P2P Systems, 2003.
• 6: Richard T. B. Ma , Sam C. M. Lee , John C. S. Lui , David K. Y. Yau, A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks, Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems, June 10-14, 2004, New York, NY, USA [doi>10.1145/1005686.1005711]
• 7: Richard T. B. Ma , Sam C. M. Lee , John C. S. Lui , David K. Y. Yau, An Incentive Mechanism for P2P Networks, Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04), p.516-523, March 24-26, 2004
• 8: Richard T. B. Ma , Sam C. M. Lee , John C. S. Lui , David K. Y. Yau, Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), v.14 n.5, p.978-991, October 2006 [doi>10.1109/TNET.2006.882904]
• 9: V. Vishnumurthy, S. Chandrakumar, and E. Sirer. Karma: A secure economic framework for peer-to-peer resource sharing. In Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Networks, 2003.
• 10: Fang Wu , Li Zhang, Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium, Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, June 11-13, 2007, San Diego, California, USA [doi>10.1145/1250790.1250844]

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  J. Computer Applications
  J.4 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
      Subjects: Economics

Additional Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.4 Distributed Systems
          Subjects: Distributed applications

General Terms:
Design, Economics, Theory

Keywords:
incentive, learning, peer-to-peer, reciprocative, stability, strategy