Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks

ABSTRACT

We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or otherwise decline to share its data. The problem is one of interdependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves efficient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compatibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  J. Computer Applications
  J.4 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
      Subjects: Economics

Additional Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.0 General

General Terms:
Design, Economics, Theory

Keywords:
interdependent values, mechanism design, sensor networks