Efficiency of selfish investments in network security

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Efficiency of selfish investments in network security

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Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems table of contents

Seattle, WA, USA

SESSION: Session 2 table of contents

Pages 31-36

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-1-60558-179-8

Authors

Libin Jiang	University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Venkat Anantharam	University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Jean Walrand	University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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ABSTRACT

Internet security does not only depend on the security-related investments of individual users, but also on how these users affect each other. In a non-cooperative environment, each user chooses a level of investment to minimize its own security risk plus the cost of investment. Not surprisingly, this selfish behavior often results in undesirable security degradation of the overall system. In this paper, we first characterize the price of anarchy (POA) of network security under two models: an "Effective-investment" model, and a "Bad-traffic" model. We give insight on how the POA depends on the network topology, individual users' cost functions, and their mutual influence. We also introduce the concept of "weighted POA" to bound the region of all feasible payoffs. In a repeated game, on the other hand, users have more incentive to cooperate for their long term interests. We consider the socially best outcome that can be supported by the repeated game, and give a ratio between this outcome and the social optimum. Although the paper focuses on Internet security, many results are generally applicable to games with positive externalities.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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	8	L. Jiang, V. Anantharam and J. Walrand, "Efficiency of Selfish Investments in Network Security", Technical Report, UC Berkeley, June 2008. (http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-77.html)