Cooperative content distribution and traffic engineering

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Cooperative content distribution and traffic engineering

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Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems table of contents

Seattle, WA, USA

SESSION: Session 1 table of contents

Pages 7-12

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-1-60558-179-8

Authors

Wenjie Jiang	Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Rui Zhang-Shen	Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Jennifer Rexford	Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Mung Chiang	Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 13, Downloads (12 Months): 94, Citation Count: 1

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ABSTRACT

Traditionally, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) make profit by providing Internet connectivity, while content providers (CPs) play the more lucrative role of delivering content to users. As network connectivity is increasingly a commodity, ISPs have a strong incentive to offer content to their subscribers by deploying their own content distribution infrastructure. Providing content services in a provider network presents new opportunities for coordination between server selection (to match servers with subscribers) and traffic engineering (to select efficient routes for the traffic). In this work, we utilize a mathematical framework to show that separating server selection and traffic engineering leads to a sub-optimal equilibrium, even when the CP is given accurate and timely information about network conditions. Leveraging ideas from cooperative game theory, we propose that the system implements a Nash bargaining solution that significantly improves the fairness and efficiency of the joint system. This study is another step toward a systematic understanding of the interactions between those who generate and distribute content and those who provide and operate networks.

REFERENCES

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