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Accountable internet protocol (aip)
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Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication table of contents
Seattle, WA, USA
SESSION: Security II table of contents
Pages 339-350  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-175-0
Also published in ...
Authors
David G. Andersen  CMU, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Hari Balakrishnan  MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
Nick Feamster  Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
Teemu Koponen  ICSI and HIIT, Berkeley, CA, USA
Daekyeong Moon  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Scott Shenker  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents AIP (Accountable Internet Protocol), a network architecture that provides accountability as a first-order property. AIP uses a hierarchy of self-certifying addresses, in which each component is derived from the public key of the corresponding entity. We discuss how AIP enables simple solutions to source spoofing, denial-of-service, route hijacking, and route forgery. We also discuss how AIP's design meets the challenges of scaling, key management, and traffic engineering.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
David G. Andersen: colleagues
Hari Balakrishnan: colleagues
Nick Feamster: colleagues
Teemu Koponen: colleagues
Daekyeong Moon: colleagues
Scott Shenker: colleagues