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Ispy: detecting ip prefix hijacking on my own
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Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication table of contents
Seattle, WA, USA
SESSION: Security II table of contents
Pages 327-338  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-175-0
Also published in ...
Authors
Zheng Zhang  Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
Ying Zhang  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Y. Charlie Hu  Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
Z. Morley Mao  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Randy Bush  IIJ, Tokyo, Japan
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

IP prefix hijacking remains a major threat to the security of the Internet routing system due to a lack of authoritative prefix ownership information. Despite many efforts in designing IP prefix hijack detection schemes, no existing design can satisfy all the critical requirements of a truly effective system: real-time, accurate, light-weight, easily and incrementally deployable, as well as robust in victim notification. In this paper, we present a novel approach that fulfills all these goals by monitoring network reachability from key external transit networks to one's own network through lightweight prefix-owner-based active probing. Using the prefix-owner's view of reachability, our detection system, iSPY, can differentiate between IP prefix hijacking and network failures based on the observation that hijacking is likely to result in topologically more diverse polluted networks and unreachability. Through detailed simulations of Internet routing, 25-day deployment in 88 ASes (108 prefixes), and experiments with hijacking events of our own prefix from multiple locations, we demonstrate that iSPY is accurate with false negative ratio below 0.45% and false positive ratio below 0.17%. Furthermore, iSPY is truly real-time; it can detect hijacking events within a few minutes.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Zheng Zhang: colleagues
Ying Zhang: colleagues
Y. Charlie Hu: colleagues
Z. Morley Mao: colleagues
Randy Bush: colleagues