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Rationality and traffic attraction: incentives for honest path announcements in bgp
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Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication table of contents
Seattle, WA, USA
SESSION: Incentives table of contents
Pages 267-278  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-175-0
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Authors
Sharon Goldberg  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Shai Halevi  IBM Research, Hawthorne, NY, USA
Aaron D. Jaggard  Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
Vijay Ramachandran  Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA
Rebecca N. Wright  Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We study situations in which autonomous systems (ASes) may have incentives to send BGP announcements differing from the AS-level paths that packets traverse in the data plane. Prior work on this issue assumed that ASes seek only to obtain the best possible outgoing path for their traffic. In reality, other factors can influence a rational AS's behavior. Here we consider a more natural model, in which an AS is also interested in attracting incoming traffic (e.g., because other ASes pay it to carry their traffic). We ask what combinations of BGP enhancements and restrictions on routing policies can ensure that ASes have no incentive to lie about their data-plane paths. We find that protocols like S-BGP alone are insufficient, but that S-BGP does suffice if coupled with additional (quite unrealistic) restrictions on routing policies. Our game-theoretic analysis illustrates the high cost of ensuring that the ASes honestly announce data-plane paths in their BGP path announcements.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Sharon Goldberg: colleagues
Shai Halevi: colleagues
Aaron D. Jaggard: colleagues
Vijay Ramachandran: colleagues
Rebecca N. Wright: colleagues