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ABSTRACT
We study collaboration among selfish agents in the tactical airport planning domain. This can be seen as a social exchange scenario, in which the efforts of performing tasks are the resources that are being exchanged. We investigate conditions under which a market mechanism with the use of standard currency leads to efficient and equitable exchange among benevolent agents. We show that, if some agents are selfish, the mechanism can become inequitable and therefore unacceptable. A straight forward penalty rule is not enough to restore equity. as it is attractive to deviate from such a rule. As a solution, we present an novel currency system, under which malicious agents can be punished, resulting in efficient and equitable exchange.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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