Incorporating user utility into sponsored-search auctions

ABSTRACT

We study principled methods for incorporating user utility into the selection of sponsored search ads. We describe variations of the GSP allocation/pricing mechanism that accommodate these user utility functions, we provide interesting and useful parallels of some of the theoretical properties from the traditional GSP mechanisms in the new GSP variations, and we present simulation results that exemplify the use of the ranking system.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  J. Computer Applications
  J.4 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
      Subjects: Economics

General Terms:
Algorithms, Economics

Keywords:
auctions, preference handling, sponsored search