JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition

ABSTRACT

Auctions, when well designed, result in desirable economic out-comes and have been widely used in solving real-world resource allocation problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. The field of auction mechanism design has drawn much attention in recent years from economists, mathematicians, and computer scientists. In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as games of incomplete information and traditional analytic methods from game theory have been successfully applied to some simple types of auctions. However, the assumption of prior common knowledge in the incomplete information approach may not hold in some auctions, and computing analytic solutions may be infeasible in other auctions. Both of these problems hold in the case of continuous double auctions.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
        I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
            Subjects: Multiagent systems

General Terms:
Algorithms, Design, Economics, Experimentation, Measurement

Keywords:
double auctions, mechanism design, trading agent competition, trading strategies