Mobile opportunistic commerce

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Mobile opportunistic commerce: mechanisms, architecture, and application

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2 table of contents

Estoril, Portugal

SESSION: Economic paradigms table of contents

Pages 1087-1094

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-0-9817381-1-6

Authors

Ece Kamar	Harvard University Cambridge, MA
Eric Horvitz	Microsoft Research Redmond, WA
Chris Meek	Microsoft Research Redmond, WA

Sponsors

AAAI : Association for the Advancement of Artifical Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Richland, SC

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 15, Downloads (12 Months): 94, Citation Count: 1

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ABSTRACT

We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procurement of goods and services in mobile settings. Our efforts seek to extend core concepts from research in electronic commerce to interactions between mobile buyers and brick and mortar businesses that have geographically situated retail offices. We focus on efficient mechanisms, infrastructure, and automation that can enable sellers and buyers to take joint advantage of the relationship of the locations of retail offices to the routes of mobile buyers who may have another primary destination. The methods promote automated vigilance about opportunities to buy and sell, and to support negotiations on the joint value to buyers and sellers including buyers' costs of divergence from their original paths to acquire services and commodities. We extend prior work on auction mechanisms to personal procurement settings by analyzing the dynamics of the cost to buyers based on preexisting plans, location, and overall context. We present mechanisms for auctions in single item, combinatorial, and multiattribute settings that take into consideration personal inconvenience costs within time-sensitive dynamic markets and challenges with privacy and fairness.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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