Mechanism design for abstract argumentation

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Mechanism design for abstract argumentation

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2 table of contents

Estoril, Portugal

SESSION: Economic paradigms table of contents

Pages 1031-1038

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-0-9817381-1-6

Authors

Iyad Rahwan	University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK and British University in Dubai, Dubai, UAE
Kate Larson	University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON, Canada

Sponsors

AAAI : Association for the Advancement of Artifical Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Richland, SC

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 5, Downloads (12 Months): 45, Citation Count: 1

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ABSTRACT

Since their introduction by Dung over a decade ago, abstract argumentation frameworks have received increasing interest in artificial intelligence as a convenient model for reasoning about general characteristics of argument. Such a framework consists of a set of arguments and a binary defeat relation among them. Various semantic and computational approaches have been developed to characterise the acceptability of individual arguments in a given argumentation framework. However, little work exists on understanding the strategic aspects of abstract argumentation among self-interested agents. In this paper, we introduce (game-theoretic) argumentation mechanism design (ArgMD), which enables the design and analysis of argumentation mechanisms for self-interested agents. We define the notion of a direct-revelation argumentation mechanism, in which agents must decide which arguments to reveal simultaneously. We then design a particular direct argumentation mechanism and prove that it is strategy proof under specific conditions; that is, the strategy profile in which each agent reveals its arguments truthfully is a dominant strategy equilibrium.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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