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Brahms: byzantine resilient random membership sampling
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Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Toronto, Canada
SESSION: R4 table of contents
Pages 145-154  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-989-0
Authors
Edward Bortnikov  Technion, Haifa, Israel
Maxim Gurevich  Technion, Haifa, Israel
Idit Keidar  Technion, Haifa, Israel
Gabriel Kliot  Technion, Haifa, Israel
Alexander Shraer  Technion, Haifa, Israel
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
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ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present Brahms, an algorithm for sampling random nodes in a large dynamic system prone to malicious behavior. Brahms stores small membership views at each node, and yet overcomes Byzantine attacks by a linear portion of the system. Brahms is composed of two components. The first one is a resilient gossip-based membership protocol. The second one uses a novel memory-efficient approach for uniform sampling from a possibly biased stream of ids that traverse the node. We evaluate Brahms using rigorous analysis, backed by simulations, which show that our theoretical model captures the protocol's essentials. We study two representative attacks, and show that with high probability, an attacker cannot create a partition between correct nodes. We further prove that each node's sample converges to a uniform one over time. To our knowledge, no such properties were proven for gossip protocols in the past.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Edward Bortnikov: colleagues
Maxim Gurevich: colleagues
Idit Keidar: colleagues
Gabriel Kliot: colleagues
Alexander Shraer: colleagues