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Secure communication over radio channels
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Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Toronto, Canada
SESSION: R3 table of contents
Pages 105-114  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-989-0
Authors
Shlomi Dolev  Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel
Seth Gilbert  EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
Rachid Guerraoui  EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
Calvin Newport  MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We study the problem of secure communication in a multi-channel, single-hop radio network with a malicious adversary that can cause collisions and spoof messages. We assume no pre-shared secrets or trusted-third-party infrastructure. The main contribution of this paper is f-AME: a randomized (f)ast-(A)uthenticated (M)essage (E)xchange protocol that enables nodes to exchange messages in a reliable and authenticated manner. It runs in O(|E|t2 log n) time and has optimal resilience to disruption, where E is the set of pairs of nodes that need to swap messages, n is the total number of nodes, C the number of channels, and t < C the number of channels on which the adversary can participate in each round. We show how to use f-AME to establish a shared secret group key, which can be used to implement a secure, reliable and authenticated long-lived communication service. The resulting service requires O(nt3 log n) rounds for the setup phase, and O(t log n) rounds for an arbitrary pair to communicate. By contrast, existing solutions rely on pre-shared secrets, trusted third-party infrastructure, and/or the assumption that all interference is non-malicious.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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S. Dolev, S. Gilbert, R. Guerraoui, and C. Newport. Gossiping in a multi-channel radio network: An oblivious approach to coping with malicious interference. In the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Distributed Computing, September 2007.
 
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S. Gilbert, R. Guerraoui, and C. Newport. Of malicious motes and suspicious sensors: On the efficiency of malicious interference in wireless networks. In the Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, December 2006.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Shlomi Dolev: colleagues
Seth Gilbert: colleagues
Rachid Guerraoui: colleagues
Calvin Newport: colleagues