Simulating new markets by introducing new accepting policies for the conventional continuous double auction

ABSTRACT

In recent years a huge number of online auctions that use Multi Agent systems have been created. As a result there are numerous auctions that provide the same product. In this case each customer can buy a product with the lowest possible price. But searching between auctions in terms of finding the suitable product can be time consuming for consumers and also providing products in different markets is a difficult task for suppliers. So the need for an autonomous agent in these types of markets is deeply felt. On the other side the structure of an auction mechanism that provides the environment for traders to operate their trades is vital.

Despite all the research that has been done about online auctions, most of them were about single markets. But in real world the stocks and commodities of companies are listed and traded in different markets. There is a growing tendency towards research about online auctions and Market Design. Particularly in recent years CAT (CATallactics) game has provided an important opportunity to develop and test new techniques in this field. In this paper after introducing CAT game and PersianCAT agent, we want to challenge the conventional accepting policy used in stock markets like New York Stock Exchange and provide a better solution that improves the general performance of the markets.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

General Terms:
Design, Economics, Experimentation, Measurement, Performance

Keywords:
accepting policy, market design, multi agent systems, trading agents, transaction success rate and CAT Competition