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SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
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Source IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) archive
Volume 16 ,  Issue 3  (June 2008) table of contents
Pages 576-589  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:1063-6692
Authors
Haifeng Yu  Computer Science Department, National University of Singapore, Singapore
Michael Kaminsky  Intel Research Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA
Phillip B. Gibbons  Intel Research Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA
Abraham D. Flaxman  Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA and Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Publisher
IEEE Press  Piscataway, NJ, USA
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DOI Bookmark: 10.1109/TNET.2008.923723

ABSTRACT

Peer-to-peer and other decentralized, distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack, a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system, the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks. Our protocol is based on the "social network" among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create. We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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REVIEW

"Vijay K Gurbani : Reviewer"

A Sybil attack consists of a rogue host that can mine arbitrary identities and get into the system. While on the surface getting multiple identities may seem innocuous, the effects of a Sybil attack can be quite dangerous. In a reputation system (  more...

Collaborative Colleagues:
Haifeng Yu: colleagues
Michael Kaminsky: colleagues
Phillip B. Gibbons: colleagues
Abraham D. Flaxman: colleagues