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SHIELD: a software hardware design methodology for security and reliability of MPSoCs
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Source Annual ACM IEEE Design Automation Conference archive
Proceedings of the 45th annual Design Automation Conference table of contents
Anaheim, California
SESSION: Securing and debugging embedded systems table of contents
Pages 858-861  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN ~ ISSN:0738-100X , 978-1-60558-115-6
Authors
Krutartha Patel  The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Sri Parameswaran  The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Sponsors
SIGDA: ACM Special Interest Group on Design Automation
: IEEE/CASS/CANDE/CEDA
: The EDA Consortium
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Security of MPSoCs is an emerging area of concern in embedded systems. Security is jeopardized by code injection attacks, which are the most common types of software attacks. Previous attempts to detect code injection in MPSoCs have been burdened with significant performance overheads. In this work, we present a hardware/software methodology "SHIELD" to detect code injection attacks in MPSoCs. SHIELD instruments the software programs running on application processors in the MPSoC and also extracts control flow and basic block execution time information for runtime checking.

We employ a dedicated security processor (monitor processor) to supervise the application processors on the MPSoC. Custom hardware is designed and used in the monitor and application processors. The monitor processor uses the custom hardware to rapidly analyze information communicated to it from the application processors at runtime. We have implemented SHIELD on a commercial extensible processor (Xtensa LX2) and tested it on a multiprocessor JPEG encoder program. In addition to code injection attacks, the system is also able to detect 83% of bit flips errors in the control flow instructions.

The experiments show that SHIELD produces systems with runtime which is at least 9 times faster than the previous solution. SHIELD incurs a runtime (clock cycles) performance overhead of only 6.6% and an area overhead of 26.9%, when compared to a non-secure system.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Krutartha Patel: colleagues
Sri Parameswaran: colleagues