| Testing for buffer overflows with length abstraction |
| Full text |
Pdf
(417 KB)
|
Source
|
International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis
archive
Proceedings of the 2008 international symposium on Software testing and analysis
table of contents
Seattle, WA, USA
SESSION: Symbolic and concrete execution
table of contents
Pages 27-38
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-050-0
|
|
Authors
|
|
| Sponsors |
|
| Publisher |
|
| Bibliometrics |
Downloads (6 Weeks): 20, Downloads (12 Months): 162, Citation Count: 2
|
|
|
ABSTRACT
We present Splat, a tool for automatically generating inputs that lead to memory safety violations in C programs. Splat performs directed random testing of the code, guided by symbolic execution. However, instead of representing the entire contents of an input buffer symbolically, Splat tracks only a prefix of the buffer symbolically, and a symbolic length that may exceed the size of the symbolic prefix. The part of the buffer beyond the symbolic prefix is filled with concrete random inputs. The use of symbolic buffer lengths makes it possible to compactly summarize the behavior of standard buffer manipulation functions, such as string library functions, leading to a more scalable search for possible memory errors. While reasoning only about prefixes of buffer contents makes the search theoretically incomplete, we experimentally demonstrate that the symbolic length abstraction is both scalable and sufficient to uncover many real buffer overflows in C programs. In experiments on a set of benchmarks developed independently to evaluate buffer overflow checkers, Splat was able to detect buffer overflows quickly, sometimes several orders of magnitude faster than when symbolically representing entire buffers. Splat was also able to find two previously unknown buffer overflows in a heavily-tested storage system.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
 |
1
|
Cristian Cadar , Vijay Ganesh , Peter M. Pawlowski , David L. Dill , Dawson R. Engler, EXE: automatically generating inputs of death, Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, October 30-November 03, 2006, Alexandria, Virginia, USA
[doi> 10.1145/1180405.1180445]
|
 |
2
|
|
| |
3
|
|
| |
4
|
V. Ganesh and D. L. Dill. A decision procedure for bit-vectors and arrays. In CAV, 2007.
|
 |
5
|
|
 |
6
|
|
| |
7
|
P. Godefroid, M. Y. Levin, and D. Molnar. Active property checking. Technical report, Microsoft, 2007.
|
| |
8
|
P. Godefroid, M.Y. Levin, and D. Molnar. Automated whitebox fuzz testing. In NDSS, 2008.
|
| |
9
|
|
| |
10
|
R. Jones and P. Kelly. Backwards-compatible bounds checking for arrays and pointers in C programs. In Third International Workshop on Automated Debugging, 1997.
|
 |
11
|
|
| |
12
|
|
| |
13
|
|
 |
14
|
|
 |
15
|
|
| |
16
|
O. Ruwase and M. Lam. A practical dynamic buffer overflow detector. In NDSS, 2004.
|
 |
17
|
|
| |
18
|
|
 |
19
|
|
 |
20
|
|
| |
21
|
D. Wagner, J. S. Foster, E. A. Brewer, and A. Aiken. A first step towards automated detection of buffer overrun vulnerabilities. In NDSS, 2000.
|
 |
22
|
|
| |
23
|
M. Zhivich, T. Leek, and R. Lippmann. Dynamic buffer overflow detection. In BUGS, 2005.
|
 |
24
|
|
CITED BY 2
|
|
Prateek Saxena , Pongsin Poosankam , Stephen McCamant , Dawn Song, Loop-extended symbolic execution on binary programs, Proceedings of the eighteenth international symposium on Software testing and analysis, July 19-23, 2009, Chicago, IL, USA
|
|
|
|
|