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Comparing different modes of horizontal information transmission in stabilizing cooperation in different complex networks
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Genetic And Evolutionary Computation Conference archive
Proceedings of the 2008 GECCO conference companion on Genetic and evolutionary computation table of contents
Atlanta, GA, USA
WORKSHOP SESSION: Evolutionary computation and multi-agent systems and simulation (ECoMASS) table of contents
Pages 1933-1938  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-131-6
Authors
Ivette C. Martínez  Universidad Simón Bolívar, Caracas, Venezuela
Klaus Jaffe  Universidad Simón Bolívar, Caracas, Venezuela
Sponsors
SIGEVO: ACM Special Interest Group on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

An Agent Based Model was used to explore the effects of spatial social networks and of different means of horizontal information transmission over cooperation when groups provide protection against predation. We tested two ways to calculate transition probabilities governing the information diffusion of the majority's opinion: using fixed rates and using a rate proportional to group' sizes. This exploration was done by observing three fixed rates for the effectiveness of information diffusion of the majority's opinion. Our results show that spatial structures affect the cooperation dynamics. Particularly in Small World Networks, cooperation is more sensible to information transmission. The type of horizontal information transmission is less important as long as over 50% of individuals follow the majority rule.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Ivette C. Martínez: colleagues
Klaus Jaffe: colleagues