Monotonicity and implementability

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Monotonicity and implementability: extended abstract

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

Chicago, Il, USA

SESSION: Characterizing incentive compatibility table of contents

Pages 48-48

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-1-60558-169-9

Author

Dov Monderer

Technion, Haifa, Israel

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 59, Citation Count: 1

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ABSTRACT

Consider a model with finite number of goods, and with buyers with private values and quasi-linear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for a buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism that implements this allocation rule. We prove that a domain of valuations of dimension at least 2 is a monotonicity domain if and only if its closure is convex.

CITED BY

Aaron Archer , Robert Kleinberg, Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness, Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 08-12, 2008, Chicago, Il, USA

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
J. Computer Applications
J.4 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES