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Cost sharing mechanisms for near-optimal traffic aggregation and network design
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ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures archive
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures table of contents
Munich, Germany
SESSION: Broadcasting in networks table of contents
Pages 85-90  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-973-9
Authors
Baruch Awerbuch  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
Rohit Khandekar  IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
SIGARCH: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Architecture
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A fundamental network design problem is the one of Traffic Aggregation or Network Design. The goal is to design a network which is able to support a unit flow for each commodity, at a time, between its source-sink pair, e.g., to support buffered multicast traffic. When the flows are unsplittable, this corresponds to the Steiner forest problem and to the problem of sharing cost of multicast by different users.

As a result of greedy selfish behavior of users in the network design game, the overall quality of the resulting solution is often not as good as the globally optimum solution of the underlying problem. We are therefore interested in the problem of designing distributed cost sharing mechanisms that induce the selfish agents to converge to the near-optimum solutions.

In this paper, our main contribution is showing that (1+ε) ratio can be achieved by (non-obvious) unfair cost sharing mechanism, at least for the fractional version of the problem. Our second contribution is showing how to implement our cost sharing mechanism which guarantees fast convergence to a near-optimum equilibrium.


REFERENCES

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V. Pai, K. Kumar, K. Tamilmani, V. Sambamurthy, and A. Mohr. Chainsaw: Eliminating trees from overlay multicast. In International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2005.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Baruch Awerbuch: colleagues
Rohit Khandekar: colleagues