Measuring integrity on mobile phone systems

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Measuring integrity on mobile phone systems

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Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the 13th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents

Estes Park, CO, USA

SESSION: Access control in systems table of contents

Pages 155-164

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-1-60558-129-3

Authors

Divya Muthukumaran	Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Anuj Sawani	Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Joshua Schiffman	Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Brian M. Jung	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Suwon-City, Gyeonggi-Do, Korea
Trent Jaeger	Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

Sponsors

SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery

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ACM New York, NY, USA

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ABSTRACT

Mobile phone security is a relatively new field that is gathering momentum in the wake of rapid advancements in phone system technology. Mobile phones are now becoming sophisticated smart phones that provide services beyond basic telephony, such as supporting third-party applications. Such third-party applications may be security-critical, such as mobile banking, or may be untrusted applications, such as downloaded games. Our goal is to protect the integrity of such critical applications from potentially untrusted functionality, but we find that existing mandatory access control approaches are too complex and do not provide formal integrity guarantees. In this work, we leverage the simplicity inherent to phone system environments to develop a compact SELinux policy that can be used to justify the integrity of a phone system using the Policy Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture (PRIMA) approach. We show that the resultant policy enables systems to be proven secure to remote parties, enables the desired functionality for installing and running trusted programs, and the resultant SELinux policy is over 90% smaller in size. We envision that this approach can provide an outline for how to build high integrity phone systems.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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