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Enforcing security properties in task-based systems
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Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the 13th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents
Estes Park, CO, USA
SESSION: Workflow systems table of contents
Pages 41-50  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-129-3
Authors
Keith Irwin  North Carolina State University
Ting Yu  North Carolina State University
William H. Winsborough  University of Texas at San Antonio
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Though a user's privileges are often granted based on the tasks that the user is expected to fulfill, the concept of tasks is usually not explicitly modeled in access control. We propose a system where tasks are the central concept that associates users to privileges. Ideally a user should be able to utilize these privileges and fulfill his tasks, but not to take harmful actions. To ensure this, a system often specifies a high-level security property to restrict the sequence of actions that a user can perform. In this paper, we propose a general model of access control in task-based system. This model considers the permissions a user as well as their temporal availability. Based on this model, we investigate the problem of enforcing security properties both statically (i.e., when tasks are assigned) and dynamically (i.e., when actions are performed). We study the complexity of static enforcement, and design efficient dynamic enforcement algorithms that avoiding unnecessary history tracking.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Keith Irwin: colleagues
Ting Yu: colleagues
William H. Winsborough: colleagues