| Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria |
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Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
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Proceedings of the 40th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
table of contents
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
Pages 355-364
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-047-0
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 10, Downloads (12 Months): 148, Citation Count: 4
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ABSTRACT
The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLS-complete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An alpha-approximate equilibrium, for α > 1, is a state of the game in which none of the players can make an α-greedy step, i.e., an unilateral strategy change that decreases the player's cost by a factor of at least α. Our main result shows that finding an α-approximate equilibrium of a given congestion game is sc PLS-complete, for any polynomial-time computable α > 1. Our analysis is based on a gap introducing PLS-reduction from FLIP, i.e., the problem of finding a local optimum of a function encoded by an arbitrary circuit. As this reduction is tight it additionally implies that computing an α-approximate equilibrium reachable from a given initial state by a sequence of α-greedy steps is PSPACE-complete. Our results are in sharp contrast to a recent result showing that every local search problem in PLS admits a fully polynomial time approximation scheme. In addition, we show that there exist congestion games with states such that any sequence of α-greedy steps leading from one of these states to an α-approximate Nash equilibrium has exponential length, even if the delay functions satisfy a bounded-jump condition. This result shows that a recent result about polynomial time convergence for α-greedy steps in congestion games satisfying the bounded-jump condition is restricted to symmetric games only.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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R. W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 2:65--67, 1973.
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CITED BY 4
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Baruch Awerbuch , Yossi Azar , Amir Epstein , Vahab Seyed Mirrokni , Alexander Skopalik, Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions in potential games, Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 08-12, 2008, Chicago, Il, USA
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Heiner Ackermann , Petra Berenbrink , Simon Fischer , Martin Hoefer, Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games, Proceedings of the 28th ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, August 10-12, 2009, Calgary, AB, Canada
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