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Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria
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Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the 40th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
SESSION: 8B table of contents
Pages 355-364  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-047-0
Authors
Alexander Skopalik  RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
Berthold Vöcking  RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLS-complete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An alpha-approximate equilibrium, for α > 1, is a state of the game in which none of the players can make an α-greedy step, i.e., an unilateral strategy change that decreases the player's cost by a factor of at least α. Our main result shows that finding an α-approximate equilibrium of a given congestion game is sc PLS-complete, for any polynomial-time computable α > 1. Our analysis is based on a gap introducing PLS-reduction from FLIP, i.e., the problem of finding a local optimum of a function encoded by an arbitrary circuit. As this reduction is tight it additionally implies that computing an α-approximate equilibrium reachable from a given initial state by a sequence of α-greedy steps is PSPACE-complete. Our results are in sharp contrast to a recent result showing that every local search problem in PLS admits a fully polynomial time approximation scheme.

In addition, we show that there exist congestion games with states such that any sequence of α-greedy steps leading from one of these states to an α-approximate Nash equilibrium has exponential length, even if the delay functions satisfy a bounded-jump condition. This result shows that a recent result about polynomial time convergence for α-greedy steps in congestion games satisfying the bounded-jump condition is restricted to symmetric games only.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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D. D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:124--143, 1996.
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R. W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 2:65--67, 1973.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Alexander Skopalik: colleagues
Berthold Vöcking: colleagues