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Robust, anonymous RFID authentication with constant key-lookup
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Tokyo, Japan
SESSION: RFID security table of contents
Pages 283-291  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-979-1
Authors
Mike Burmester  Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Breno de Medeiros  Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Rossana Motta  Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A considerable number of anonymous RFID authentication schemes have been proposed. However, current proposals either do not provide robust security guarantees, or suffer from scalability issues when the number of tags issued by the system is very large. In this paper, we focus on approaches that reconcile these important requirements. In particular, we seek to reduce the complexity of identifying tags by the back-end server in anonymous RFID authentication protocols---what we term the key-lookup problem.

We propose a compiler that transforms a generic RFID authentication protocol (supporting anonymity) into one that achieves the same guarantees with constant key-lookup cost even when the number of tags is very large. This approach uses a lightweight one-way trapdoor function and produces protocols that are suitable for deployment into current tag architectures. We then explore the issue of minimal assumptions required, and show that one-way trapdoor functions are necessary to achieve highly scalable, robustly secure solutions. We then relax the requirement of unlinkable anonymity, and consider scalable solutions that are provably secure and for which the loss of privacy is minimal.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mike Burmester: colleagues
Breno de Medeiros: colleagues
Rossana Motta: colleagues