ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against side-channel key recovery
Full text PdfPdf (6.48 MB)
Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Tokyo, Japan
SESSION: Block cipher table of contents
Pages 56-65  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-979-1
Authors
Christophe Petit  Université catholique de Louvain
François-Xavier Standaert  Université catholique de Louvain
Olivier Pereira  Université catholique de Louvain
Tal G. Malkin  Columbia University
Moti Yung  Columbia University and Google Inc.
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 13,   Downloads (12 Months): 112,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1368310.1368322
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), both in the black box world and in the physical world, separately. We first show that the construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model. Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the adversary does not increase with the number of physical observations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typically the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor involves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by an exponential factor, making the probability of a successful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a first interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a cryptographic scheme influences its side-channel resistance.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
 
2
 
3
M. Bellare, T. Kohno, A Theoretical Treatment of Related-Key Attacks: RKA-PRPs, RKA-PRFs, and applications, in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5656, pp 491--506, Warsaw, Poland, May 2003.
 
4
 
5
 
6
FIPS 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard," Federal Information Processing Standard, NIST, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, November 26, 2001.
 
7
 
8
9
 
10
 
11
P. Kocher, Design and Validation Strategies for Obtaining Assurance in Countermeasures to Power Analysis and Related Attacks, in the proceedings of the NIST Physical Security Workshop, Honolulu, Hawai, September 2005.
 
12
P. Kocher, Leak Resistant Cryptographic Indexed Key Update, US Patent 6539092.
 
13
S. Mangard, Hardware Countermeasures against DPA - A Statistical Analysis of Their Effectiveness, in the proceedings of CT-RSA 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2964, pp 222--235, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 2004.
 
14
S. Micali, L. Reyzin, Physically Observable Cryptography, in the proceedings of TCC 2004, LNCS, vol 2951, pp. 278--296, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, February 2004.
 
15
C. E. Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems, in Bell Systems Technical Journal, vol 28, num 4, pp 656--715, 1949.
 
16
F.-X. Standaert, T. G. Malkin, M. Yung, A Formal Practice-Oriented Model for the Analysis of Side-Channel Attacks, Version 2.0, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/139, 2006.
 
17
F.-X. Standaert, E. Peeters, C. Archambeau, J.-J. Quisquater, Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks, in the proceedings of CHES 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4249, pp. 30--45, Yokohama, Japan, October 2006.
 
18
K. Tiri, M. Akmal, I. Verbauwhede, A Dynamic and Differential CMOS Logic with Signal Independent Power Consumption to Withstand Differential Power Analysis on Smart Cards, ESSCIRC 2003.
 
19
A. C. Yao, Theory and Applications of Trapdoor Functions (Extended Abstract), in the proceedings of FOCS 1982, pp. 80--91.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Christophe Petit: colleagues
François-Xavier Standaert: colleagues
Olivier Pereira: colleagues
Tal G. Malkin: colleagues
Moti Yung: colleagues