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Executable misuse cases for modeling security concerns
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International Conference on Software Engineering archive
Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Software engineering table of contents
Leipzig, Germany
SESSION: Specification II table of contents
Pages 121-130  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-079-1
Authors
Jon Whittle  Lancaster University, Lancaster, Gt Britain
Duminda Wijesekera  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
Mark Hartong  Federal Railroad Administration, Washington, DC, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSOFT: ACM Special Interest Group on Software Engineering
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Misuse cases are a way of modeling negative requirements, that is, behaviors that should not occur in a system. In particular, they can be used to model attacks on a system as well as the security mechanisms needed to avoid them. However, like use cases, misuse cases describe requirements in a high-level and informal manner. This means that, whilst they are easy to understand, they do not lend themselves to testing or analysis. In this paper, we present an executable misuse case modeling language which allows modelers to specify misuse case scenarios in a formal yet intuitive way and to execute the misuse case model in tandem with a corresponding use case model. Misuse scenarios are given in executable form and mitigations are captured using aspect-oriented modeling. The technique is useful for brainstorming potential attacks and their mitigations. Furthermore, the use of aspects allows mitigations to be maintained separately from the core system model. The paper, supported by a UML-based modeling tool, describes an application to two case studies, providing evidence that the technique can support red-teaming of security requirements forn realistic systems.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Jon Whittle: colleagues
Duminda Wijesekera: colleagues
Mark Hartong: colleagues