| Gsp-exr: gsp protocol with an exclusive right for keyword auctions |
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International World Wide Web Conference
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Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
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Beijing, China
POSTER SESSION: Posters
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Pages: 1089-1090
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-085-2
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 1, Downloads (12 Months): 15, Citation Count: 0
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ABSTRACT
We propose a keyword auction protocol called the Generalized Second Price with an Exclusive Right (GSP-ExR). In existing keyword auctions, the number of displayed advertisements is determined in advance. Thus, we consider adjusting the number of advertisements dynamically based on bids. In the GSP-ExR, the number of slots can be either 1 or K. When K slots are displayed, the protocol is identical to the GSP. If the value per click of the highest ranked bidder is large enough, then this bidder can exclusively display her advertisement by paying a premium. Thus, this pricing scheme is relatively simple and seller revenue is at least as good as the GSP. Also, in the GSP-ExR, the highest ranked bidder has no incentive to change the number of slots by over/under-bidding as long as she retains the top position.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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Matthew Cary , Aparna Das , Ben Edelman , Ioannis Giotis , Kurtis Heimerl , Anna R. Karlin , Claire Mathieu , Michael Schwarz, Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
[doi> 10.1145/1250910.1250949]
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B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review, 97:242--259, 2007.
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H. R. Varian. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25(6):1163--1178, 2007.
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