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SMash: secure component model for cross-domain mashups on unmodified browsers
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International World Wide Web Conference archive
Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web table of contents
Beijing, China
SESSION: Security II: web client security table of contents
Pages 535-544  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-085-2
Authors
Frederik De Keukelaere  IBM Tokyo Research Laboratory, Yamato, Japan
Sumeer Bhola  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY, USA
Michael Steiner  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY, USA
Suresh Chari  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY, USA
Sachiko Yoshihama  IBM Tokyo Research Laboratory, Yamato, Japan
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Mashup applications mix and merge content (data and code) from multiple content providers in a user's browser, to provide high-value web applications that can rival the user experience provided by desktop applications. Current browser security models were not designed to support such applications and they are therefore implemented with insecure workarounds. In this paper, we present a secure component model, where components are provided by different trust domains, and can interact using a communication abstraction that allows ease of specification of a security policy. We have developed an implementation of this model that works currently in all major browsers, and addresses challenges of communication integrity and frame-phishing. An evaluation of the performance of our implementation shows that this approach is not just feasible but also practical.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Frederik De Keukelaere: colleagues
Sumeer Bhola: colleagues
Michael Steiner: colleagues
Suresh Chari: colleagues
Sachiko Yoshihama: colleagues