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Offline count-limited certificates
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Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing table of contents
Fortaleza, Ceara, Brazil
SESSION: Computer security table of contents
Pages 2145-2152  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-753-7
Authors
Luis F. G. Sarmenta  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Marten van Dijk  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Jonathan Rhodes  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Srinivas Devadas  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Sponsor
SIGAPP: ACM Special Interest Group on Applied Computing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present the idea of offline count-limited certificates (or clics for short), and show how these can be implemented using minimal trusted hardware functionality already widely available today. Offline count-limited certificates are digital certificates that: (1) specify usage conditions that depend on irreversible counters, and (2) are used in a protocol that guarantees that any attempt to use them in violation of these usage conditions will be detected even if the user of the certificate and the verifying party have no contact at all with the outside world at the time of the transaction. Such certificates enable many interesting applications not possible with traditional (unlimited use) certificates, including count-limited delegation and access, offline commerce and trading using cashlike migratable certificates, and others. We show how all these applications can be made possible by using only a simple trusted timestamping device (TTD), which can in turn be implemented using existing trusted hardware devices such as smartcards, and the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chips embedded in PCs available today. Significantly, our solutions do not require trust in any other components in the host machines aside from the TTD itself; they remain tamper-evident as long as the TTD is not compromised, even if the entire host system, including the BIOS, CPU, OS and memory, is compromised. This not only provides better security by minimizing the required trusted computing base, but also makes implementation possible on present-day machines without requiring a particular kind of OS. We demonstrate all these ideas by implementing a prototype application that runs under both Linux and Windows, and presenting experimental performance results.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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L. F. G. Sarmenta and contributors. TPM/J: Java-based API for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). http://projects.csail.mit.edu/tc/tpmj/, Dec. 2006.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Luis F. G. Sarmenta: colleagues
Marten van Dijk: colleagues
Jonathan Rhodes: colleagues
Srinivas Devadas: colleagues