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Evaluating the partial deployment of an AS-level IP traceback system
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Source Symposium on Applied Computing archive
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing table of contents
Fortaleza, Ceara, Brazil
SESSION: Computer networks table of contents
Pages 2069-2073  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-753-7
Authors
André O. Castelucio  Military Institute of Engineering, Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil
Ronaldo M. Salles  Military Institute of Engineering, Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil
Artur Ziviani  National Laboratory for Scientific Computing, Petrópolis - RJ - Brazil
Sponsor
SIGAPP: ACM Special Interest Group on Applied Computing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks currently represent a serious threat to the appropriate operation of Internet services. We propose an IP traceback system to be deployed at the level of Autonomous Systems (ASes) to deal with this threat. Our proposed AS-level IP traceback system contrasts with previous work as it requires a priori no knowledge of the network topology while allowing single packet traceback and incremental deployment. We also investigate and evaluate the strategic placement of our systems, showing that the partial deployment offered by our proposed system provides relevant results in IP traceback, rendering it feasible for large-scale networks such as the Internet.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
André O. Castelucio: colleagues
Ronaldo M. Salles: colleagues
Artur Ziviani: colleagues