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Examining the motivations of defection in large-scale open systems
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Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing table of contents
Fortaleza, Ceara, Brazil
SESSION: Trust, recommendations, evidence and other collaboration know-how table of contents
Pages 2035-2039  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-753-7
Authors
Rowan Martin-Hughes  The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, Australia
Jochen Renz  The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, Australia
Sponsor
SIGAPP: ACM Special Interest Group on Applied Computing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In large-scale open systems such as eBay one of the key concerns in increasing the utility of users is having a trustworthy method for users to determine which interactions will be satisfactory and which are liable to lead to disappointment. Rather than starting from the point of assuming there are good and bad users we will examine why we can make such a distinction in this context and how humans mitigate some of the problems which seem endemic to such a system through game modification. We then demonstrate a use of this model of behaviour in simulating a particular agent choice in order to show the conditions under which different reputation systems affect an agent's trustworthiness, before briefly describing possible future directions of research to deal with the truly disenfranchised agents.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Rowan Martin-Hughes: colleagues
Jochen Renz: colleagues